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The Scope and Implications of “Morals Not Knowledge”
John H. Evans, University of California, San Diego
I greatly appreciate the opportunity provided by the editor of Zygon to 
further develop the ideas in my book in conversation with the four critical 
commentaries.  It is an honor to have one’s work focused upon so intently, 
and I greatly appreciate the time and effort of the critics.  The book was 
quite intentionally written as a provocation, an attempt at agenda-setting, 
and as a call for changing the thinking of the entire religion and science 
academic community.  In my previous writings I have kept close to the data, 
allowing myself at best mid-level conclusions, but this book is a foray into 
the abstraction and inevitable lack of precision required for high level 
generalization.  I hope that it continues to be generative of debate.
Before engaging the thoughtful comments of my critics, I briefly 
summarize what I would have said the book was about before I read the 
critics reviews.  As noted, the book is called Morals Not Knowledge: 
Recasting the Contemporary U.S. Conflict Between Religion and Science.  If 
interested in reading it, it is available for sale in standard paper form, but 
has also been made available by the University of California press for free 
download in multiple formats.  The free download is best found through a 
google search of the full title.
My goal in the book is try to dismantle the myth that there is a conflict 
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between religion and science over methods of knowing the natural world for 
the American public.  I show that in actuality, probably starting in the 1960s, 
there has been a conflict in the U.S. between religion and science over 
morality.  I spend many pages showing that the participants in the religion 
and science debate – the “elites” who are primarily academics – portray the 
conflict they are trying to dismantle as about knowledge, and in portraying 
the relationship as concerning knowledge, inadvertently perpetuate the 
knowledge conflict myth.
I describe three types of relationships between religion and science.  
The first is over systemic knowledge, with religion and science as 
hierarchically organized systems of deductive justification for knowledge 
claims about the natural world, the 16th century origins of which Peter 
Harrison has so effectively explained.  (Harrison 2015)  This is where science 
finds the age of the earth through observation and reason, and religion 
through sacred texts and faith.  If this is what is happening in the public, 
then scientists should not be able to believe any religion, and religious 
people should not believe any science.  The book shows that this model is 
not found in the public.  
This sort of deductive logic from first principles is the relationship held 
by academics.  I spend a few chapters in the book showing that while trying 
to undermine the idea of conflict, elites in the religion and science debate 
reinforce the idea that there are competing deductive systems of religion 
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and science that need to be synthesized.  I am an equal opportunity critic in 
that my home discipline of sociology is probably the worst offender.  Of those
disciplines making claims about what people do or have done, Sociology 
really has no excuse because it focuses on the present.  History has an 
excuse because, I would hypothesize, the discussion about religion and 
science by the general public more than 50 years ago may well have 
concerned systemic knowledge of nature.  Elites who are not describing but 
advocating – mostly theologians and philosophers – should advocate for the 
systemic knowledge perspective because that is their job.  After all, the 
definition of a theologian (at least in sociology) is a person who synthesizes 
and makes religious ideas coherent.  The problem comes when it is implied 
that the systemic knowledge perspective of the academics is shared by the 
public.
The second relationship concerns what I call “propositional belief,” and
it is also about knowledge, but knowledge claims that do not presume logical
justification or deduction from higher level beliefs.  One such propositional 
belief could be “the earth is 6,000 years old.”  With an unconnected belief 
about the natural world such as this, someone could believe all other 
scientific claims and be a practicing scientist.  An academic would be fired 
for such an “illogical” stance, but I argue that this is how the few fact 
disputes between religion and science operate for ordinary religious people.  
Thus, conservative evangelicals have no problem saying that science is 
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wrong that the earth is ancient, while simultaneously believing all scientific 
claims about how electrons operate.  Most importantly, if this is the 
knowledge conflict that exists, it is much, much less socially consequential, 
because it does not limit shared understanding of the world for the vast 
majority of scientific claims.  The book has a chapter demonstrating that the 
religious public in the U.S. is not engaged in systemic knowledge conflict 
with science, but a few religious groups are in propositional belief conflict 
with science over a few fact claims (e.g. human evolution).
The third relationship, and most instances of contemporary conflict, 
concern morality.  While science portrays itself as the morally neutral 
investigator of nature, that is not how science is seen by the public.  More 
importantly, science is seen as promoting morals that are at odds with 
religion in both a narrow sense (e.g. embryonic stem cell research), and a 
more expansive sense (e.g. the periodic attempts to create a religion of 
science to provide meaning for society).  The possibility of moral conflict is 
largely ignored in the elite academic religion and science literature.  It is 
discussed with religion and science conflicts from the mid-19th century 
forward, such as the controversies over Darwin, but I argue in the book that 
at least American religion changed by the mid-20th century to not concern 
knowledge claims about the natural world at all.  At the same time, science 
started conducting research into territory long thought to be “religious,” 
primarily the nature of the human body, reproduction and “life.”  To 
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understand the relationship between religion and science in the 
contemporary world, and among ordinary religious people, we have to 
examine morality, not knowledge of the natural world.  
The editors have selected critics from an extremely wide range of 
perspectives – from my home discipline of sociology (Ecklund and her 
colleagues), theology and science (Harris), science studies (Elsdon-Baker) 
and communication/rhetoric (Crick).  Since there are therefore few common 
critiques, I largely respond in turn while identifying commonalities as I go.
ARE MY CLAIMS GENERALIZABLE?
I start with my most comfortable home territory.  Sociologists Ecklund, 
Mehta and Bolger raise four cautions about the limitations of the claims that 
were the result of data and analysis limitations.  What Ecklund and her 
colleagues summarize as not attending to the voices of minority Christians 
and religious minorities are variants of the same issue, and both are the 
result of the fact that the book is trying to make a statement about the 
people in the U.S. through the use of nationally-representative surveys. 
Social science research design has a fundamental tension.  If one 
wants to make a statement about “the population of the U.S.,” as I attempt 
to do in my book, one is forced to examine people in the proportions they 
exist in the larger population.  Therefore, racial and religious minorities are 
part of that generalization, but the analyst cannot examine them separately 
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because there are too few cases.  For example, Muslims are about 1% of the 
population in the U.S., so in a typical representative survey of 1600 people 
there will be 16 Muslims – far, far too few to make any claims about.  So, my 
generalizations remain accurate, they just blur over the distinctiveness of 
any particular group.  I should note Ecklund and her colleagues are not 
contesting this, I am just making this point for clarity for the interdisciplinary 
reader.  I should also add that the book limits its claims about the public to 
the U.S., although I do touch on elites from the broader Anglophone world 
because they share a field of discourse (as demonstrated by the existence of
this very journal).  
Their question is then whether my generalization can be used to 
describe each sub-group in the U.S.  Imagine I made a generalization that 
the residents of the American deep south are supporters of President Trump,
but we could ask whether that generalization fits the members of the 
Democratic club of Mobile, Alabama.  So, my first answer is that I do not 
know if my generalization would be an accurate depiction of racial or 
religious minorities within the U.S., but I want to encourage someone to try 
to find out.  What would be required is to focus on those groups, such as 
conducting an in-depth interview study of African American congregations, 
which is the data that Ecklund and her colleagues are referencing.
There are two sets of claims I make that may or may not be 
generalizable.  The first is that religious people are generally not in systemic 
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knowledge conflict with science, but may have a few fact claims that they 
disagree about, and that any conflict is largely about morality.  From what I 
know about racial minorities in the U.S. from reading other studies, including 
those from Ecklund and her colleagues  (Tinsley, Prickett and Ecklund 2019), 
I would hypothesize that my generalization does fit.  For example, I do not 
think that African Americans have any more of a system of religious 
knowledge than do white people, and as Ecklund and her colleagues 
describe, if anything African Americans have more reason to be in moral 
conflict with science.  African Americans have been on the losing end of 
“scientific” claims about race, have been secretly experimented upon by 
scientists and much else that would lead this group to be suspicious of the 
morality of scientists.
I am less sure that religious minorities fit my generalization.  Religious 
minorities in the U.S. each comprise 1% of the population or less.  From 
Ecklund’s new book on the religious views of scientists across the world, I 
would speculate that the entire concept of “religion vs. science,” concerning 
knowledge or morality, is largely a Jewish and Christian concern.  For 
example, I doubt my generalizations fit the less than 1% of the U.S. public 
who are Hindu. (Ecklund et al. 2019)
The other question of “fit’ they raise is whether any of the substantive 
moral concerns about science would be different for racial and religious 
minorities than they are for white Christians of various types.  I would say, 
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absolutely.  Again, someone would have to do a case study of each religious 
tradition, but we do know, for example, that Jews view science quite 
differently than do Christians  (Efron 2018).  As Ecklund and her colleagues 
note, concerns about science in the Islamic public, at least in Europe, are 
ultimately about moral boundary drawing with the white Christian 
population, not about knowledge per se.  
Ecklund and her colleagues’ fourth point is about the difference 
between scientific elites (like those at research universities who are 
interviewed for the media) and regular citizens who are scientists but who 
have no particular power for influencing other’s views.  In general, non-elite 
scientists are more like all other non-elites when it comes to religious 
practice.  I think Ecklund and I both have in mind a chemist who works at a 
perfume company designing scents.  I hope I was clear in the book that I do 
not consider all scientists to be elites, but rather I was talking about the 
views of elites who are scientists.
My book is primarily about what ordinary religious people in the U.S. 
think about science.  It is largely unknown where the public gets its view of 
what science “is,” what its claims are, and in particular what its moral stance
is.  Is “science” for the average citizen in the U.S. represented by Bill Nye 
“the Science Guy,” or celebrity physicist Neil deGrasse Tyson, or by their 
high school biology teacher?  Ecklund and her colleagues remind us that this 
question is important for any future work in this area.
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Finally, this set of critics is correct that I measure effects at an 
individual level and largely assume the community mechanisms that cause 
these effects.  Examining religious moral communities, presumably through 
ethnography or an in-depth interview study of a congregation, would show 
how particular religious beliefs and practices form particular moral views.  To
take a hypothetical, I have shown elsewhere that liberal Protestants are 
opposed to the group-level eugenics implied by many reproductive genetic 
technologies  (Evans 2010, Ch.5)  What sort of practices would produce this 
particular moral vision?  At least by the 1960s U.S. liberal Protestant children
– and probably other Christians – would sing a song in front of the 
congregation whose first words were “Jesus loves the little children; all the 
children of the world; red, brown, yellow, black and white; they are precious 
in his sight; Jesus loves the little children of the world.”  This moral message 
of the equal value of all humans is undoubtedly burned into the 
consciousness of Christians from that era, whether or not they could ever 
identify the location in the Bible or theological concepts that supports this 
view.  If we really would want to know how religious beliefs and practices 
translate into moral views (which could conflict with science), similar in-
depth research would be required.
Ecklund and her colleagues effectively identify a large group of 
research projects that are required to see which sub-groups in the U.S. 
population actually fit with my generalization, and to examine the detailed 
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implications of my claims.  I know we share the hope that social scientists 
will take up these projects.
DO ELITES MAKE SYSTEMIC KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS?
Fern Elsdon-Baker is primarily concerned with the extent to which 
elites actually use what I call systemic knowledge, and if they do, why they 
do.  As a high level clarification, I should note that any empirical claim I make
should be prefaced by the words “tend to.”  That is, I would not say that all 
academics always use systemic knowledge and in its ideal form.  Rather, 
they tend to, more so than do ordinary people.  Therefore, to perhaps 
muddle my metaphor beyond all usefulness, even the analytic philosopher’s 
pyramid of deductive justifiable knowledge is a bit fuzzy in practice.  
However, I would continue to assert that disciplines have ideals of systemic 
knowledge that I describe even though academics do not achieve these 
ideals in practice.  Elsdon-Baker challenges whether the systems of 
knowledge used by academics and the ordinary public stand in “stark 
contrast” to each other.  I think I would endorse the “stark contrast” view, 
while recognizing that the meaning of “stark” will differ for each reader of 
this text.
Elsdon-Baker then adds some real pragmatic reality to my narrative, 
which is that participants in these debates are not operating within one 
institutionalized system of knowledge of a discipline but across disciplines – 
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some of which they may not have good knowledge of.  I agree that this is the
case.  She also points out that most academics do not synthesize all of their 
knowledge into exhaustive system of deductive justification.  I agree entirely.
However, such hierarchy is often implicit in what they assume from their 
training.  For example, I do not believe I have ever been taught, or have ever
written out the statement “I believe that claims about society are best 
justified through observation.”  But, somehow when you get a PhD in 
sociology all of your closer to the ground claims assume the higher level 
statement – even if few PhD students could even articulate that this is the 
justification.  
All of this raises a point that I largely avoid in the book, which is how 
much logical systemization of knowledge is required to produce these 
patterns in the data I see.  What my data actually shows, upon further 
reflection, is that ordinary Christians in the U.S. do not have even the 
fuzziest, weakest of pyramids.  Many of my empirical tests are simply 
whether those who believe in a “non-scientific” religious claim (like the earth
being less than 6000 years old) agree with other scientific claims.  They 
typically do.  I actually have no data on any more coherence than that.  My 
point is that only a theologian or philosopher would care that this most basic 
level of coherence is met.
Elsdon-Baker raises a separate challenge about why academics 
implicitly assume that the public shares their view of systemic knowledge 
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conflict.  My mechanism – admittedly without supporting data – is what 
Elsdon-Baker calls projection.  That is, academics just assume that the public
views things as they do.  Actually, my mechanism is a combination of 
projection and institutionalization – the latter because contemporary 
academics may have learned this view when it was actually correct, before 
the late 1960s.  
However, she raises another mechanism, which is that the academics 
are just learning the public myths.  She shows interesting data from the UK 
and Canada that the public believes there is conflict between religion and 
science, even if they themselves are not in such a conflict.  I had not thought
of this mechanism before, and it is plausible.  To my mind it implies a 
feedback loop where finding the chicken and the egg will be impossible.  The
mechanism would be that academics and other elites teach the public that 
there is a systemic knowledge conflict between religion and science, the 
public believes this, and the next generation of academic is raised in this 
culture, and then reinforces this view for the next generation.
Finally, she asks where the public would get their view of religion and 
science.  I only discuss academics as one contributor to this view, but do not 
discount other possible contributors.  She identifies another contributor in 
her survey, which is the internet.  I have no doubt that this is now the 
primary source of information on almost anything.  To complicate the story 
further, in the book I report on an admittedly limited analysis of what 
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happens when you search in google for “religion and science.”  Not only do 
you get pages that use the systemic knowledge perspective, but most of the 
content ultimately comes from academics.  That said, investigation of 
religion and science on the internet is very important.  I appreciate the 
clarifications and challenges Elsdon-Baker raises about my views of elites, 
and I hope that she and others can conduct investigations of this topic.
MORALS AND KNOWLEDGE
I now turn to Crick and Harris, both of whom, writing from intellectual 
traditions quite far from my own, suggest how my book may change the 
thinking outside of social science.  To be flippant, the overall claim of Nathan
Crick is that the book should have been titled, and taken the perspective of, 
“morals and knowledge,” instead of “morals not knowledge.”  That is, his 
core claim is that I make a binary distinction in the entire book between 
morals and knowledge, assuming that they are fully separate phenomena, 
when in actuality they are not.  To make my book more applicable to the 
contemporary world, he argues that I should not rely upon the dichotomy.
He proposes that I mix morals and knowledge as a way to further what 
he sees as my political goals in the book.  I never write about my normative 
goals – a not uncommon stance among social scientists.  I adhere to the old 
fashioned formulation attributed to Max Weber, where I use my values to 
select a topic to focus upon, and then I attempt to be morally neutral in my 
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analysis of the data.  While many disagree with this stance, I conclude that 
discussing my own politics can confuse the issue.  However, I will use Crick’s 
comments as a springboard to discuss the motivation for the book, because 
it will be important below.
Crick says that my motivation is to re-describe the relationship 
between religion and science so as to facilitate new alliances between 
religion and science that will forward a common cause of fighting climate 
change.  This is true in a narrow sense.  While I am concerned about climate 
change, I primarily use it as an example throughout the book because it is 
one that the reader is familiar with and, most importantly, there is a lot of 
discourse in the public sphere to use as data.  My substantive concerns 
throughout my career has been on the impact of technology applied to 
humans – like reproductive genetic technology – and whether the moral 
message that comes with this technology results in our dehumanization. 
(Evans 2010; Evans 2016)
But, upon further reflection, my deeper motivation for writing the book 
is that it is yet another continuation of my now decades-long project of trying
to make sure that any debate in the public sphere, such as the one currently 
underway about human gene editing, is simultaneously “thick” and “thin.”  
(Evans 2002) To massively simplify, a “thick” debate is about what values we
should use to understand an issue like gene editing, and which means would 
be consistent with those values.  (You will notice an affinity with this idea and
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Crick’s recommendations, of which more below).  A “thin” debate is not 
about values per se, but about which means will most efficaciously advance 
taken for granted, institutionalized values.  In an earlier book I showed how 
Christian social ethics and moral theology birthed the field now called 
bioethics, and earlier debates by theologians about “thick” value laden 
concerns like what a human should be were displaced, along with the 
theologians, by bioethicists.  Bioethicists asked the thin question of whether 
gene editing maximized one of four values portrayed as universally held by 
American society (autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice). 
(Evans 2002)
For a proper debate in a liberal democratic society, we need both the 
thick and the thin debate.  However, at least in the human technology 
debates on which I have focused, when the theologians moved away from 
these debates in the U.S., the thick debate disappeared from at least the 
part of the bioethics debate that impacts what actually happens with 
science.  So, I want to publicize the fact that despite the impression one 
would get from the academic religion and science literature, contemporary 
religious Americans look at science and primarily see values, not facts.  They
should talk more about values in scientific activity. Moreover, the power of 
scientists in these debates is that they appear to not be promoting values at 
all, but simply facts.  If people realize that they too are promoting values, 
perhaps this can open up the “thick” debate about science and technology 
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that needs to happen. Science without values in the public sphere simply 
reverts to “that which can be done should be done.”
Enough about my motivations.  Crick’s account of my motivation is 
primarily to demonstrate that I need a better account of the relationship 
between morals and knowledge in order for my ideas to have further impact.
Crick focuses on the fact that I treat knowledge and morals as a binary, 
portraying knowledge as emerging and being recognized independent of 
morals.  Crick would say that in actuality they are combined.  I agree.  
Crick develops his case by using the views of pragmatist philosopher 
John Dewey and rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke.  When reading Crick’s 
critique, I fully recognized the perspective he is articulating.  Indeed, the 
theoretical/epistemological part of the discipline of sociology that I inhabit is 
called “cultural sociology,” and it shares a similar orientation with the 
pragmatists.  Sociologists tend to refer to similar ideas by referencing the 
symbolic interactionist tradition, or the social constructionist arguments of 
Peter Berger, which were partially built upon the ideas of George Herbert 
Mead. (For a typical discussion of the links between this part of sociology and
pragmatism, see  (Shalin 1986))  
Crick writes that a pragmatic approach in my case would best be called
“morality through inquiry,” and morality is dependent on what the public 
views the nature of the situation to be.  Most critically, the pragmatist 
tradition would say that what are thought to be the facts or justified 
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knowledge in the situation will shape the moral conclusion.  So would the 
reverse: the a-priori morals will shape what are thought to be facts.
Given that I agree with Crick, why did I write a book that uses such a 
stark dichotomy? First, I was essentially testing a hypothesis that is stated by
others as a dichotomy.  Much of the book is dedicated to demonstrating that 
the religion and science academic world – particularly the theologians, 
historians and social scientists – are focused at best on science and religion 
in conflict over knowledge and at worst on the claim that this conflict is over 
systemic knowledge.  
To try to make a very strong statement that any conflict in the public 
between religion and science is not about knowledge, I presented the simple 
case of “knowledge” as portrayed by academics vs. “not knowledge” (e.g. 
morals).  Crick is making an important suggestion in how my claims can be 
built upon.
The second reason is that I am engaged in high level generalization 
using social science data, which requires simplified theories.  There is 
agreement among sociologists that a number of sophisticated sociological 
theories are “true,” but they are not used to organize our data gathering or 
analysis because they require more fine-grained measuring tools than those 
that exist.  Indeed,  sociology has long relied upon theoretical dichotomies to
be able to connect theories to inevitably messy data – structure vs. agency; 
structure vs. culture; public vs. private; and fact vs. value (for a list of 23 of 
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these, including fact vs. value, see the book literally titled “core sociological 
dichotomies.” (Jenks 1998))  Theorists who say that structure and agency 
interact in various ways, or loop back and forth with time and so forth are 
generally convincing, but when it comes time to design the next research 
project and particularly when it is time to interpret the data, one finds 
oneself falling back upon simplified dichotomies.  Yet, as we tell our graduate
students, it is important to be aware of how complicated the social situation 
is, even if you cannot measure it at the required level of complexity.  
So, I would argue that my simplification is correct, and it is also likely 
that the more detailed account given by Crick is as well.  Social surveys, 
which I relied upon heavily in the book, cannot be used to demonstrate 
sophisticated theoretical accounts.  Possibly a case study based on 
ethnographic or in-depth interview data could.  I hope that others pursuing 
this line of inquiry consider his hypothesis.
As Crick points out, if anyone is going to try to use what I have written 
to change the practice of religion and science, they will have to come up with
a theory of a relationship between the two beyond my simplistic dichotomy.  
He offers one, based on the distinction between primary and secondary 
interpretations.  Roughly, primary interpretations are “facts” – knowledge – 
such as “carbon dioxide produced by humans will increase the average 
temperature on the planet x degrees in 30 years.”  Secondary 
interpretations are the arrangement of facts in meaningful order following 
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philosophies, ideologies, myths and so on.  “Whatever their character, these 
secondary interpretations share the same function which is to embed 
primary interpretations within a large narrative understanding that places 
the facts in a dramatic relationship to action” he writes (P.22).  To take a 
simple example of this process, not all facts are considered relevant to a 
particular moral decision.
I think this takes me to a more sophisticated yet analogous place.  My 
call is for everyone to recognize that scientists have values that they use – 
accounting for Crick’s clarification – to organize their facts.  Contemporary 
American religious citizens, with a few exceptions, rely upon science for their
facts, but order those facts in a particular way based on their values.  What 
Crick has given us is a way to talk to scientists that allows me to show that 
their fact making role is secure, but that due to the proliferation of facts and 
the impossibility of any normal person keeping track of all facts, they need to
advocate a secondary (moral) interpretation to make sense of it all.
I will finish my discussion of Crick by focusing on what was for him, I 
think, an aside.  On page 19 he articulates a more sophisticated version of 
the source of conflict between religion and science than I offer.  I say “morals
and not facts,” while he says that scientific knowledge changes social 
situations, which then require different moral solutions.  Scientific knowledge
is the engine of potential conflict because it unsettles taken for granted 
situations that have a set repertoire of moral solutions.  I would say that this 
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only leads to moral conflict between scientists and a religious group if the 
religion has an inflexible, limited supply of moral solutions.  This accounts for
the basic feature of the history of religion and science debates, which is that 
the religions that view their theology and associated morality as evolving 
(e.g. Anglicanism) are those with the least moral conflict with science, while 
those who claim that their theology and associated morality have been 
constant for nearly 2000 years (e.g. American fundamentalist Protestantism) 
have the most moral conflict.  This also largely accounts for Catholicism, 
which for the past few hundred years has largely accepted the claims of 
institutional science about facts of the natural world, but has moral conflict 
with science – perhaps because the institutions that establish its theology 
and associated morality are designed to change slowly.
Let’s apply this to Darwin.  The traditional knowledge conflict account 
would be that Darwin explained the origins of humans using the scientific 
method and the religious used interpretation of sacred texts, and thus any 
conflict was over knowledge.  My account is that Darwin’s ideas created a 
moral message that conflicted with the morals of various religious groups of 
the time. (Dawson 2007; Noll 1994, 153, 189; Shapiro 2013)  Crick’s account 
would be that the knowledge generated by Darwin unsettled a number of 
social situations, which then seemed to require a different repertoire of 
moral options.  Darwin created a situation where these new facts meant that 
all sorts of new decisions had to be made about the relationship of humans 
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to animals and how humans should relate to each other.  This unsettled 
morality, resulting in conflict.  Crick’s comments provide valuable insights 
about how to reconfigure the debate about religion and science, and I hope 
to pursue his ideas.
ELITES . . . AGAIN
I appreciate Mark Harris’ light-hearted depiction of my use of the term 
“elite” by referencing a popular line from a Brexiteer.  Of course, in an 
American university I would be most concerned with showing the similarity of
my term and a similar quote from a Trumper.  But, seriously, in sociology the
term “elite” has no negative connotations, except for those vanishingly few 
who think that a society can exist without hierarchies.  The term is just a 
description of differential roles in society, some of which come with more 
power than others.  All societies above a very low level of complexity need 
elites.
Harris’ insightful comments complement the other commentaries so 
well not only because he is bringing in a theological and scientific 
perspective, but because he is focused on what I am calling the elite religion 
and science debate.  To be clear, elites have a role in any large scale social 
interaction, and the elites in the religion and science debate need to 
continue on with what they do.  I am accusing the elites of not 
acknowledging that they are in a symbiotic relationship with “the masses” 
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(to take one formulation) or “the public” (which is the term I use in the 
book).  The elites in this debate at best do not acknowledge that the public 
thinks differently about religion and science, and at worst imply that the 
public has the same view as the elites. Harris is using my book as a 
springboard to improve those elite debate, and I will push his suggestions a 
little further, undoubtedly beyond the limits of my expertise, and hope that 
those more qualified than I will take up the task he outlines.
Harris starts with a series of clarifications and extensions on my 
depiction of the elites in the religion and science debate.  I will combine his 
first two points to acknowledge that the elite debate has perhaps always 
been about rejecting the idea of inherent conflict between religion and 
science, while also saying that Harris is right that my point was to say that 
elites do not “deliberately broadcast the message of conflict,” but 
“disseminate it nonetheless.”  To go a bit further, I could also say that 
disseminating the message while explicitly denying it may make the 
message of conflict even more powerful for the public.
In his third point he enumerates the many theoretical schemes used by
elites to describe the relationship between religion and science, such as 
those of Barbour, Gould, Stenmark and Peters.  On the one hand, I am 
adding yet another distinction (between knowledge and morals).  On the 
other, I hope that my other distinction – between the elites and the public – 
helps to make sense of this dizzying array of distinctions by demonstrating 
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that some are applicable to the elite debate and some to the public.  By this 
point in my response the reader is aware that sociologists have a penchant 
for generalizations, so I would say that the relationships between systemic 
knowledge, propositional knowledge and morality would account for 90% of 
everything we would ever want to say about the public.  
To be provocative by over-stating the case, if the goal of theological 
harmonizers or synthesizers was to have the religious citizens accept these 
syntheses, a victory has been won, so such efforts can cease.  There is 
essentially no knowledge conflict remaining to synthesize.  This is either 
because the synthesizers have been so effective at making clear that 
contemporary scientific claims are consistent with theology or, in what would
be a pyrrhic victory, success has been achieved not through synthesis but by
the abandonment of religious claims about nature by the laity.
I want to really expand upon Harris’ fourth clarification of my 
statements about elites.  He writes that the field of religion and science grew
along with secularization of Western societies.  Following Drees, he sees that
disproving a “science vs. religion” conflict is the result of a need to “assert 
the legitimacy of religious belief in the face of scientific marginalization,” and
that therefore much of the elite literature has the feel of apologetics.  I agree
with his insight, but would add additional motivations that I see operating in 
the defense of religion, at least among sociologists.  That impulse to say, 
“see, religion is not the ignorant thing you think it is” is also driven by the 
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desire to always be questioning the taken for granted.  Others seem to be 
motivated by taking the side of the weaker side in a fight.  And, particularly 
among humanistically-oriented social scientists, there is a deep seated 
desire to defend some glimmer of sacredness against the onslaught of the 
techno-rational mundane, even if the analyst does not believe all of those 
religious details themselves.  Whatever the motivation, I agree that there is 
an urge in the field of religion and science to say that religion is legitimate.
Whenever the field of religion and science began, let us assume that 
the defense of religion meant defending it as a knowledge system, either 
because that was a core component of Christianity back then, or because it 
was scientists who got to define the terms of the dispute, and since they 
think of themselves as only producing knowledge, any group that conflicts 
with them must also be about producing knowledge.  Either way, as a 
strategy to defend religion, defining religion as primarily concerning 
knowledge that can or cannot be synthesized with science will result in less 
religion.  Science, which is the arbiter of legitimate knowledge of the natural 
world, defines what is legitimate about your religion, making religion a sub-
set of science.
But, the response from the reader will be, “religion is about so much 
more than knowledge of the natural world.”  Exactly, I would say, so why not 
bite the bullet and just remove knowledge claims about nature from 
theology?  There are fact claims about the natural world that no scientist 
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cares about that happened long ago – like the Resurrection – but in the 
contemporary world, for anything that any scientist actually cares about, the 
vast majority of religions and religious people agree with.  But, religion is 
about the meaning of facts (see Crick’s critique).  Sure, religion and science 
can disagree about the Resurrection (if science cares), but we agree on 
millions of other fact claims about the world.  What is the meaning of these 
facts?  If the point is to defend religion against secularization at the hand of 
science, this approach puts religion in the driver’s seat.  I acknowledge that 
this is letting Steven J. Gould define religion, but his concept of the non-
overlapping magisteria appears to not only be advocacy, but an empirically 
accurate depiction of the public’s view.  I am sure I am unknowingly 
describing an approach taken in the history of Christian theology – my only 
point is to say that such an approach seems to be sociologically necessary.
Harris has a few additional critiques of the book, and the first of which 
is to question whether there really is systemic knowledge conflict among 
elites.  Harris worries that my claim that there are two deductive and 
coherent knowledge systems, represented in the book by two distinct 
pyramids, goes to far, making the two to be distinct, “like chalk and cheese.”
I should have been more clear in the book about my use of generalization.  
The pyramids are more like ideal-types, cases which do not actually exist in 
the data but are a “one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and
by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and 
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occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena.”  (Weber 1949, 90) 
Ideal types are supposed to be chalk and cheese, and they do hide the 
messy reality behind them.  Therefore, the only people who may truly reside 
in the ideal-types would be Richard Dawkins and a American Protestant 
Fundamentalist.  Everyone else has pyramids that overlap in some way.
Finally, Harris argues that ordinary Christians do use a pyramid of 
deductive knowledge, like the elites do.  He identifies the justificatory claim 
at the apex as the Incarnation (“Jesus is the Son of God”) from which follow 
lower level beliefs.  I would say that if religious people do have a deductive 
pyramid, it is not very tall and it is very fuzzy and disorganized, compared to 
that used by elites.  If they had a tall, organized one this would mean that 
they had spent a lot of time reading or listening to Christian theology, which 
most ordinary Christians do not have time for.
To adjudicate this claim I will unfortunately, but with a friendly smile, 
use the social scientists’ conversation stopper, which is: show me your data. 
That is, I would argue that the people Harris has encountered in churches are
different from ordinary American Christians.  Some sources of this difference 
could be that they are unusually interested in the organization of their 
religious knowledge (e.g. in theology).  I could easily be convinced that 
British Christians, given that participating in religion is more of a social 
choice than in many parts of the U.S., are more aware of theology.  I could 
be convinced that the Catholic and Anglican traditions that dominate the UK 
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are more focused on theology than are American Christian traditions.  And, 
now for the social scientist full employment act of 2019 – I call for more 
research into this very question.  I thank Harris for prompting me to think 
about some of the larger ramifications of what I have written.
I would like to again thank the four critics for their attention to my 
argument.  Given my attempt to speak across a large range of the disciplines
involved with the religion and science literature, including those who 
participate in the life of this journal, I have no doubt that I got many of the 
details wrong.  I hope that the reader will see enough insight in the book to 
reconsider how work in religion and science proceeds.
REFERENCES CITED
Dawson, Gowan. 2007. Darwin, literature and Victorian respectability. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
.Ecklund, Elaine Howard, David R. Johnson, Kirsten R.W. Matthews, Steven W.
Lewis, Robert A. Thomson, and Di Di. 2019. Secularity and science: 
What scientists around the world really think about religion. New York: 
NY: Oxford University Press.
Efron, Noah. 2018. Jews. In The warfare between science and religion: The 
idea that wouldn't die, edited by Jeff Hardin, Ronald L. Numbers, and Ronald 
A. Binzley. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
27
Evans, John H. 2002. Playing God?  Human Genetic Engineering and the 
Rationalization of Public Bioethical Debate. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press.
———. 2010. Contested Reproduction: Genetic Technologies, Religion, and 
Public Debate. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2016. What is a human? What the answers mean for human rights. 
New York: NY: Oxford University Press.
Harrison, Peter. 2015. The Territories of Science and Religion. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press.
Jenks, Chris. 1998. Core sociological dichotomies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.
Noll, Mark A. 1994. The Scandal of the evangelical mind. Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans.
Shalin, Dmitri N. 1986. Pragmatism and social interactionism. American 
Sociological Review 51, no. 1: 9-29.
Shapiro, Adam R. 2013. Trying biology: The Scopes trial, textbooks, and the 
antievolution movement in American schools. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Tinsley, Cleve, Pamela J. Prickett, and Elaine Howard Ecklund. 2019. Black 
Protestant views of science. Du Bois Review 15, no. 2: 533-46.
Weber, Max. 1949. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: Free 
Press.
28
29
